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The Problem of Subjectivity in Value Judgment 
David K. Rod 
Stated simply, the problem of subjectivity in value judgment is 
the problem of defending one's evaluation of a theatrical performance 
as being anything more than a matter of personal opinion. Evaluative 
assertions appear often to be statements about the objective nature of 
a performance; but on closer examination, they invariably turn out to 
be manifestations of the critic's subjective responses to the perfor-
mance. As such, the validity of these assertions becomes questionable, 
and their status as important components of the critical process 
becomes highly problematic. 
Critics have not always felt constrained by the problem of sub-
jectivity. Plato, for instance, in identifying works which he judged to 
be unsuitable as educational materials for the guardians of his ideal 
republic, gave no indication that he considered his choices to be a 
matter of personal opinion. Instead, he pointed to passages from the 
works in question and used the presence of such passages as the 
criterion for passing judgment on each work (Republic 377b-383c). 
Similarly, Aristotle distinguished the finest kind of tragic plot from 
less excellent ones on the basis of formal features recognizable in 
such plots. He did not suggest that a different critic might be al-
lowed a different set of preferences in regard to tragic plots (Poetics 
1452b-1454a). 
In the twentieth century, however, the issue of subjectivity has 
dominated the discussion about critical evaluation, and any authorita-
tive pronouncement about the value of a particular artwork is certain 
to be challenged. Among the most coherent discussions of the problem 
of subjectivity in value judgment is the one which appears in the 
introduction to Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism. Frye argues 
that evaluation has no place-or, at best, only a very limited place-
in true criticism: 
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Value-judgments are subjective in the sense that they can 
be indirectly but not directly communicated. When they are 
fashionable or generally accepted, they look objective, but 
that is all. The demonstrable value-judgment is the 
donkey's carrot of literary criticism, and every new critical 
fashion . . . has been accompanied by a belief that criticism 
has finally devised a definitive technique for separating the 
excellent from the less excellent. But this always turns out 
to be an illusion of the history of taste. (20) 
According to Frye, judgments about the comparative value of different 
artworks-the extent to which one work is better than another~are 
always based upon prevailing systems of social, moral, or intellectual 
values; and as these systems of value change with time, so may all 
comparative assessments of artistic value. Furthermore, the judgment 
of positive value within an artwork, which Frye identifies as the real 
concern of the evaluating critic and which he says "produces the 
direct value-judgment of informed good taste, the proving of art on 
the pulses, the disciplined response of a highly organized nervous 
system to the impact of poetry" (27)—such judgment is always limited 
by the fallibility of individual good taste, by such evaluation's being 
based, necessarily, on direct experience of the artwork, an experience 
which criticism can talk about but never reproduce, and by the fact 
that enjoyment of a work and critical approval of that same work are 
not the same thing (20-29). Terry Eaglet on, in summing up Frye's 
argument about subjectivity in value judgment, puts it rather neatly: 
"When we analyze literature we are speaking of literature; when we 
evaluate it we are speaking of ourselves" (92). 
For the critic of theatrical performance, the kinds of limitations 
imposed by this modern distrust of value judgments in criticism can be 
a serious problem. In the first place, Frye's notion that the direct 
experience of the artwork must somehow be a separate issue from the 
critical study of that artwork does not apply very well to theatre. In 
theatre, direct experience of the artwork, the performance, is all the 
critic has to work with, for the performance is ephemeral; it exists 
only while the critic is experiencing it. A literary critic can read a 
poem or novel once for pleasure and then go back and examine it 
thoughtfully, methodically, and critically; but the theatrical critic must 
find a way to combine the direct experience of performance with the 
critical examination of that performance-or, if the two are irrecon-
cilably separate, then to do both separately at the same time. Under 
such conditions, it is difficult to see how subjective response can be 
kept out of theatrical criticism. 
In the second place, the theatrical critic is especially likely to be 
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interested in examining the performance as an interaction between 
what happens onstage and what happens in the auditorium. That is, 
by contrast again to the situation in literary criticism, an audience is 
prominently present at a theatrical performance; and critics of theat-
rical performance will, therefore, be especially prone to take the 
audience into account in their critical considerations of performance. 
As Timothy J. Wiles puts it, 
[I]f art exists not only in objects by which we know it but 
also in the experience of those who perceive it, their exis-
tential presence is also a component of art. In other 
words, art is not art "in general" but is made up of the 
particular, unrepeatable interactions between the original 
creator's work and each of its new recipients, a transaction 
which leaves neither party unchanged. Of course, art 
possesses an aspect as a tangible and unalterable object, 
like a statue, just as it possesses an aspect as a changing 
and change-making interaction. Perhaps theater exists to 
illustrate this second aspect of art; for more than any 
other, theatrical art depends upon living and present media-
tors, actors and audience, for both its meaning and its 
existence. (2) 
Under this view, even the artwork itself is not entirely objective. 
If it is the interaction between audience and staged play which is 
the proper focus of critical examination for the theatre critic, then 
value judgments must be inextricably involved in theatrical criticism, 
for value judgment is an inherent part of the audience's interaction 
with the performance. That is, an audience will continuously make 
judgments about what is presented on stage, those judgments deter-
mining the nature and shape of the audience's reaction to the perfor-
mance. As a member of the audience, the theatre critic will find his 
or her own judgments to be intimately bound up in the pattern of 
interaction which is the artwork. Even to describe, as non-evaluative-
ly as one can, what occurs in a performance reveals, as Eagleton 
would point out, a series of judgments as to what has been worthy of 
notice (12-13). 
Furthermore, it should be noted, judging value in a performance 
is not a single, monolithic proposition, a saying of yea or nay to the 
production as a whole. There are numerous aspects of a theatrical 
performance which present themselves for critical evaluation, and any 
informed critical response to the performance must involve many 
different kinds of value judgments. Thus, for instance, the critic will 
judge the expertise of the various participants in the performance, 
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making some assessment of the degree of skill displayed by each of 
them. Also, the critic will judge the worthiness of the material being 
performed, assessing the extent to which the play rewards the effort 
expended by the performers in putting it on and the time expended by 
the audience in watching it. Beyond these basic kinds of judgments, 
the critic may also evaluate the truthfulness of the performance (i.e., 
the extent to which it reveals something authentic about the nature of 
human experience), the morality of the performance (the extent to 
which it affirms or violates a given set of moral standards), the 
beauty or expressiveness of the performance (the extent to which it 
exhibits any of various aesthetic qualities or stimulates any of various 
aesthetic responses), or simply the ability of the performance to hold 
interest. Obviously, these various kinds of value judgments will 
interact with one another, as well as operating on larger or smaller 
levels within the performance as a whole, creating finally a very 
complex process. 
Evaluation, then, although admittedly subjective, is not something 
that can be eliminated from the audience's response to theatrical 
performance; and if every member of the audience is thought of as 
being a critic, there is no problem of subjectivity in regard to value 
judgments in theatre. Even if every subjective, critical evaluation of 
a performance is different under such circumstances, audience members 
can simply be allowed to disagree. 
The problem of subjectivity arises, of course, when the value 
judgments of certain individual audience members are given prominence 
for one reason or another: usually either because they are published 
in a newspaper or other mass medium, because they have extraordinary 
impact on the fortunes of those involved in the performance, or be-
cause they are presented together with a claim for their definitive 
validity, often in some scholarly forum. In this regard, a distinction 
has frequently been made between evaluations offered by "reviewers" 
and those offered by true "critics," the former supposedly providing 
their personal and unavoidably subjective responses to a performance 
in the form of a play review whereas the latter supposedly engage in 
a more thoughtful, deliberate, and objective assessment which will nor-
mally be published in a scholarly journal or book. In practice, the 
distinction generally turns out to be a distinction between critics of 
performance and critics of dramatic literature, for the scholarly critic 
of performance has only more time to work with than does a play 
reviewer, not more material (since the performance is ephemeral) and 
not a greater potential for objectivity. At least, it is arguably not 
true that taking a week or a month to write one's evaluation of a 
performance makes that evaluation more objective than one which is 
written immediately after the performance occurs (see also Brockett 
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68). 
If all evaluative responses to performance are subjective and if 
some, by virtue of the way the world works, must nonetheless claim a 
more-than-usual degree of validity, then what is needed is a reliable 
method of evaluating value judgments, of assessing the extent to 
which any individual evaluative response to performance represents a 
valid assessment of the quality of that performance. Although such 
second-level evaluation involves its own set of theoretical difficulties, 
the range of reasonable approaches is, at least, somewhat more limited. 
Among the various possible methods for evaluating value judg-
ments, the one least respected in scholarly circles (although perhaps 
most honored in practical use) is evaluation based upon contemporary 
popularity. The basic assumption of this approach is that, if many 
people hold a particular value judgment of a theatrical work, then 
that value judgment is likely to be valid. Thus, a work's value can be 
measured in terms of its box-office appeal, which has at least the 
distinctive merit of providing an easily measurable assessment of the 
relative value of different theatrical works. 
In scholarly discussions, the idea of assessing a work's merit on 
the basis of its popularity is most often mentioned only to be dis-
carded—as is the case here. Certainly, a serious critic would like to 
distinguish between audience enjoyment of a performance and critical 
approval of that performance, even if both must be acknowledged to 
be subjective responses. Experience demonstrates that one can recog-
nize value in a performance one does not enjoy and that, conversely, 
one can derive pleasure or amusement from a performance one recog-
nizes as being of inferior quality (see Frye 28). Box-office success 
measures only the extent to which audiences enjoy a work, not the 
extent to which they approve critically. 
More difficult to discard offhand is evaluation based upon a 
play's continuing popularity over an extended period of time. The 
fact that the works of Shakespeare, for instance, have continued to 
earn high ratings from audiences over the centuries while the works 
of most of his contemporaries have not suggests that those high 
ratings have had some validity, while the more temporary popularity of 
playwrights like Beaumont and Fletcher represented a faulty value 
judgment on the part of seventeenth-century audiences. Under this 
view, it may be conceded that current theatrical fare is difficult or 
impossible to evaluate objectively and reliably but, the argument goes, 
a hundred years from now, critics will have a clearer view and will be 
able to separate what is merely fashionable from what has true and 
lasting value. 
While there is much good sense in this line of thought, especially 
when it is applied to art in general, there is an inherent difficulty in 
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requiring theatre art to pass the test of time. Theatrical per-
formances do not last a hundred years. Indeed, even the memory of a 
theatrical performance lasts only for the duration of a person's life-
time, and a hundred years from now, critics will be able only to 
speculate about the characteristics and value of our current theatrical 
art. Furthermore, whenever the evaluation of a theatrical performance 
matters, it always matters now and not one hundred years from now. 
In sum, methods of evaluating judgments based on how wide-
spread those value judgments are prove to be unsatisfactory. Thus, 
the effort among theatre scholars to establish some degree of reliabil-
ity in the evaluation of theatrical performance tends to focus on one 
of two other methods. 
Some writers on the proper approach to theatrical criticism have 
suggested that the way to achieve a modicum of reliability in evalua-
tive judgments is to minimize the impact of subjectivity by providing 
an impersonal theoretical construct against which the value of any 
individual work can be measured. Kenneth M. Cameron and Patti P. 
Gillespie, for instance, argue that a true critic can be distinguished 
from a mere reviewer because the former evaluates on the basis of an 
established theory rather than on the basis of personal opinion: 
Most of all, what [the critic] is not is someone who uses / 
a lot. Indeed, it may be said that a function of theory is 
the short-circuiting of /: it is not "my" emotions or "my" 
beliefs that enter into judgment, but an intelligent analysis 
based on an accepted theory. (426) 
The theory, presumably, is a construct which can be applied by any 
intelligent human being, and comparing the individual art work to the 
theory can be accomplished without involving the critic's personal and 
subjective interests or tastes. 
Unfortunately, Cameron and Gillespie conclude that, since no 
theory of performance exists at present, no true criticism of perform-
ance is possible either (427). Thus, their analysis does not really 
facilitate a non-subjective evaluation of performance. 
Other writers have offered constructs which are less comprehen-
sive than a complete theory but which still provide the critic with a 
set of guidelines against which to compare performances. For ex-
ample, there is Goethe's set of three basic questions~What is the 
playwright trying to do? How well has he or she done it? Is it 
worth doing?~which has been elaborated upon by such recent writers 
as James H. Clay and Daniel Krempel into a rather extensive outline 
composed of specific questions that a critic can apply to a perform-
ance (150-151). The difficulty with such constructs is that they must 
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either finally restate the basic subjective question, "Is it good?"-
perhaps hiding that question in the midst of a welter of specific, 
objective questions--or else they threaten to reduce criticism to the 
application of a formula, making no accommodation for unanticipated 
genius. In any case, no set of guidelines currently commands the kind 
of widespread allegiance that would set it apart as a reliable method 
of evaluating theatrical performances. 
A second general approach to the problem of subjectivity in 
criticism begins by acknowledging that audience interaction with art is 
necessarily and inescapably a personal and subjective matter and, 
instead of trying to eliminate the human factor from the critic's 
response to the work, tries simply to identify the best personal and 
subjective response to the work. Under this view, not all individual, 
subjective responses to a performance are created equal; there are 
certain individuals who, by virtue of their experience or sensitivity, 
deserve to have their responses to the performances treated with 
special respect. 
Susanne K. Langer puts forward this view in the course of her 
extensive discussion of the nature of art in Philosophy in a New Key: 
Standards of art are set by the expectations of people whom 
long conversance with a certain mode—music, painting, 
architecture, or what not-has made both sensitive and 
exacting. (263) 
Later, in Feeling and Form, she identifies the characteristic which 
qualifies people to understand art as "responsiveness," and she argues 
that responsiveness is a natural gift, not something that can be 
taught. Like creative talent, however, responsiveness can be developed 
by experience (396). Thus, it must be understood to exist in varying 
degrees in different people, making some people better qualified than 
others to appreciate art by virtue of their natural capacities for 
responsiveness and the extent to which those capacities have been 
developed. 
Although this notion of the subjective views of certain critics 
being specially privileged may grate against the democratic sensibilities 
of contemporary society, it does provide a method of rating the qual-
ity of diverse value judgments offered in respect to a particular 
performance; one need only examine the qualifications of the various 
critics offering those value judgments. Furthermore, as some writers 
have noticed, this elitist view of criticism provides a rationale for the 
education of theatre critics, one that does not depend upon the crea-
tion of a critical formula that can supposedly be applied to all 
performances. 
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Stephen M. Archer, for instance, devotes a section of his discus-
sion of the critic's role in theatre to listing what he calls "the 
qualities of the excellent critic." Among these, he includes love of 
the theatre, fairness, theatrical experience, writing skills, and 
concentration (251-252). George R. Kernodle, too, argues that the 
problem of subjectivity in theatrical criticism can be ameliorated if 
critics learn to take a proper attitude toward their task: 
In making his evaluation, the critic places his own feelings 
in the wider context of his vision of the theatre and his 
belief in human values. Even if his primary response to the 
theatre, as to any real experience in art or life, is sub-
jective, unique, and individual, it is not an isolated 
experience. . . . A complete evaluation may start with the 
critic's own spontaneous likes and dislikes, but it also 
involves his ideas of what kind of institution the theatre 
should be and of how the drama can best serve the spiritual 
needs and purposes of his day. (646) 
Thus, Kernodle urges critics to maintain a wide view, recognizing the 
broad range of human needs and pleasures that theatre serves, for 
criticism undertaken with such an attitude will be the most worthy 
kind of criticism. 
Of course, rating critical evaluations on the basis of characteris-
tics possessed by the critics making those evaluations is not really a 
solution to the problem of subjectivity in criticism. It is more like an 
admission of defeat. Subjectivity is inescapable; therefore, rather than 
trying to avoid subjectivity, we try to identify the most suitable 
subject. In practical terms, the best we can do is, first, to choose 
carefully which critical voices we pay attention to and, second, for 
those of us who are educators, to bend our efforts toward raising the 
level of critical responsiveness in future theatre audiences. 
University of Iowa 
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